There are no official dates; in fact, institutional communication has once again sunk into a kind of limbo reminiscent of other times – the end of a cycle. There are indications, expectations behind the scenes: Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, is expected to arrive soon. He was here around this time last year as well; in that sense, there is nothing particularly new.
But there is a new context: during the first five months of the year, meetings multiplied in Beijing with secretaries from this Government; and there is still one secretary yet to be appointed. The Economy and Finance portfolio has been vacant for nearly two months.
Formally, it is up to the Chief Executive to fill the vacancy; in practice, neither the local nor the central authorities seem concerned with preserving the symbolism of autonomy. Or perhaps, on the contrary, they are determined to show exactly how it does – or does not – work.
Xia Baolong arrives at the beginning of the week; by the end of the week, the name expected to replace Tai Kin Ip should emerge. The price of this chain of command is the weakening of accountability: from the Economy portfolio to Praia Grande; from there to the Liaison Office, which answers to the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office; which in turn falls under the State Council… and Xi Jinping. If economic diversification and Hengqin continue trapped in this limbo, it will be nothing short of outrageous.
The concern is understandable: the position is sensitive and increasingly relevant, given the clouds hanging over diversification; and it marks the third reshuffle within the Government during this new cycle: André Cheong leaving for the Legislative Assembly, Wong Sio Chak moving to Administration and Justice, and Chan Tsz King entering Security.
There is another hidden issue in this decision: whether or not to maintain a Government of bureaucrats, with little political instinct and no business experience
Also at the top of the strategy agenda is the bitter cherry called Hengqin, where strong pressure from Beijing is evident in an investment plan that is showing signs of becoming unworkable. In this context, it is better to decide late but wisely than early and poorly. Especially because the issue is much more about structure and vision than about names and titles.
There is another hidden issue in this decision: whether or not to maintain a Government made up of bureaucrats with little political instinct and no business experience. The choice of Sam Hou Fai — a jurist trained to shut the office door to political maneuvering and economic lobbying — created the need to surround him with officials accustomed to running the administrative machine, itself unfamiliar territory for the Chief Executive.
Now approaching the midpoint of the term, there is an urgent need for reflection: how can economic diversification be achieved without anyone who understands business and markets; without awareness of the delicate balance between public planning and private investment, between workforce qualifications and consumer trends?
Rather than placing that burden entirely on the shoulders of the future Secretary for Economy and Finance — an unfair and dysfunctional solution — Xia Baolong should confront this structural indecision himself. If the plan continues to fail, there is little point in insisting that the blame lies solely with the local authorities.
