Donald Trump arrives in Beijing weakened. The attack on Iran was meant to corner China’s ally in the Middle East, but the plan backfired. Instead, he now finds himself asking for help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a problem he did not have before walking into the dead end he created for himself.
It is no coincidence that, the week before, China’s Foreign Minister received his Iranian counterpart. With the serene smile that has become his trademark, Xi Jinping will extract a high price for the help now requested by his American “friend”.
Three conclusions are now obvious. First, Tehran will secure a peaceful nuclear programme — Wang Yi was clear on that point. Second, Washington will have to ease pressure on Taiwan — it has little room to do otherwise. Finally, and no less importantly, if Trump comes to negotiate and strike deals, as is his hallmark and as suggested by the high-level trade delegation accompanying him, he will have to put an end to the blackmail of trade tariffs.
Brussels is drifting ever further from Washington, though not necessarily closer to Beijing
Vladimir Putin also finds himself in a difficult position. As the invasion of Ukraine approaches its fifth year, he already needs Trump’s help to celebrate Victory Day without Zelensky’s drones disrupting the festivities in Red Square. Whatever exit emerges from the “special blunder” he got himself into, there is now broad consensus that Moscow lacks the capacity to break Ukraine on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, Putin is winking at Brussels. The problem is simple: Ukraine is now probably the greatest military power in Europe; consequently, those who attacked Kyiv are now alarmed by the prospect of Zelensky becoming the new guru of security strategy on the Old Continent.
It is true that Beijing also has a bill to pay: Europe remains wary of China, and Zelensky will not forget the “eternal partnership” between Xi and Putin. However, Beijing and Moscow are not ideologically as close as they may appear; their alignment has far more to do with circumstance than with any shared militaristic conviction, something that is not part of the Chinese model of globalisation. In time, that distinction will become apparent.
When we look at the landscape that will emerge after these two wars, Trump and Putin may well join hands and shed crocodile tears. By contrast, the “Dragon” is becoming less and less dormant — and it has not even had to breathe fire to spread its wings.
Xi’s greatest challenge now lies in Europe. A gigantic consumer market — and repository of values — that is finally preparing to assume its own strategic autonomy. And that is the balance on which Beijing now rests.
Brussels is moving ever further away from Washington, but not necessarily closer to Beijing. From an ideological standpoint, and in terms of alliance politics, there are reasons for that distance — difficult to overcome unless the alternative bloc of the emerging world order changes some of its practices and narratives.
