Huang Kunmin — much more than just a heavyweight in Canton, as the Communist Party Secretary of Guangdong — is Beijing’s star descending to the provinces in October 2022. He comes directly from Xi Jinping’s circle, who in 2017 entrusted him with a seat on the Politburo — where he still serves — at the time in charge of propaganda. Unsurprisingly, he was the first to receive Sam Hou Fai, as soon as the Chief Executive took office, in search of a “north” for Macau. Is the outlook from the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office becoming cloudier? The line remains the same; in fact, there is only one decision-making power now. But the tone is different, and the method diverges — as do the networks of influence, or *guanxi*.
In Macau, a growing belief has taken hold: that this shift in direction is what rattled Ho Iat Seng, who was thought to be closer to Xia Baolong’s constellation — or at least believed so.
Xi Jinping’s message is clear: Hengqin exists to support Macau’s economic diversification. Any deviation from this mission cannot be tolerated. This isn’t a literal translation, but it captures the essence of what he conveyed during his December visit — immediately reflected in the Policy Address report: Macau will invest in Hengqin’s second phase of development — industrialization — following the blueprint already laid out.
Quietly, local unease is growing. No one openly objects, but the elite feel their local interest networks coming undone; the public fears job competition; and the political class knows it’s walking the red line of autonomy. The signs point to a reinforcement of the traditional influence of Guangdong’s Communist Party — decisive during colonial times.
Sam Hou Fai leaves some clues: on one hand, he says young people need exposure to the world — growth won’t happen only here. On the other hand, diversification is impossible without the opportunities Hengqin opens up. The compass is now pointing toward a business-friendly environment; a competitive tax regime — including offshore legislation — and internationalization channels, to attract investment and companies that see the advantage of operating in the Greater Bay Area from the MSAR. It’s a concept with theoretical logic — and, in practice, obvious risks. This Government embraces the new cycle without reservations, unlike the recent past, which, although nationally aligned, was never truly committed to Hengqin. Edmund Ho was the first and last to have a bold idea: to buy Montanha Island — promptly shut down by Canton.
What’s underway now can no longer be stopped, but there are dangerous curves ahead. First, from a political, legal, and fiscal standpoint, it remains to be seen how this relocation of investment will truly impact Macau in terms of revenue diversification, GDP distribution, and job creation. Next, there’s a big difference between having in Hengqin a tool that genuinely serves Macau — or having to foot the bill, using gaming tax revenue, for a neighboring project with a long history of poor planning and delayed execution.
Everyone answers to Beijing — Canton included. But next door, there are powerful forces with significant national influence, strong centrifugal pull in the regional context, political clout, investment capital, international experience, and skilled labor. And they know, as Macau does, that this isn’t a competition anyone wants to enter — nor are they prepared to. The naive attempt to avoid that monster has failed; now, rather than resisting it, the strategy must be to engage it.
Now that everything has changed, everything will have to change — starting with how we read the compass. Either the people of Macau learn to interpret the North and find their own path, or the North will simply dictate it for them.
*Director-General of PLATAFORMA.
