While the Chief Executive was still negotiating his team in Beijing last November, PLATAFORMA was already advancing the possibility of Wong Sio Chak moving from Security to Administration and Justice — and becoming number two in the Government. Meanwhile, André Cheong not only held on to his portfolio but also took on Hengqin; surprising those who insisted that Sam Hou Fai’s plan was, after all, another. Less than a year later, what would have seemed natural in light of the new cycle now emerges in the form of a crisis — unprecedented and intriguing. Justice be done… well managed, or rather, contained; with Sam Hou Fai projecting authority but also control and cohesion. Everyone spoke with one voice: who comes in, who rises, and who leaves.
Cheong is being “sold” as the next president of the Legislative Assembly; a theory that gives him the role of pivot for Xia Baolong’s vision: the Legislature serving the Executive. As the second-highest figure of the State, he would remain at the epicenter of the regime; even running as an outsider for the future succession to the Palace. He is not finished — far from it. He will carry out the role and wait for the fate determined by the line that currently dominates the Palace. He maintains support and networks — both national and local — and is seen across various sectors, including traditional ones, as an experienced mediator between central power and localism. In other words, the status quo likes him; the same status quo that rejects modernisms and foreignisms, and seeks to contain national competition. Still, it is at the very least difficult to buy into the idea that a kick upstairs — formally speaking — is in practice a promotion. Real power lies within the Executive; and that is where Cheong had influence in the Game: in regional integration, in Administrative reform… even in external relations. Now, he no longer has a say in any of that.
In the hardest, rawest version, Sam Hou Fai actually banged his fist on the table; though negotiating this cushioned fall: appointed legislator. It is widely said that relations between the two were tense, whether or not some recent serious and definitive episode occurred. In this view, Cheong won the first battle by being reappointed; but soon lost the war. Sam Hou Fai gave way at first, and now imposes cohesion in his own way, elevating Wong Sio Chak. Chan Tsz King, who takes over Security, is also considered close to both the Chief and Wong. O Lam, who from Social Affairs and Culture manages the largest share of the Budget, also gains political margin and a renewed aura — freed from Cheong’s shadow.
The heaviest weight is indeed Wong Sio Chak, ever closer to the Palace. The doubt remains as to whether he can embody modernization and openness — the national discourse for Macau — or whether he is truly the hard and security-oriented face of the regime. Many see him as the chief controller, given his police background; others describe him as a legalist, sensitive to Portuguese legal culture; above all, faithful and competent. He now leaves his comfort zone, exposing himself to difficult reforms in Administration and Justice; in addition to the Hengqin mission — nearly impossible. If he does not take on that responsibility, unlike his predecessor, he loses status; if he does, he gains perhaps the most poisoned gift.
The Secretary for Economy and Finance is another name in the mix, since Hengqin naturally falls under his portfolio. An emerging star of the new cycle, he is quickly losing his shine in the black hole of a diversification that remains nowhere in sight — neither near nor far. Tai Kin Ip even risks becoming the last scapegoat left to absorb the Executive’s wear and tear.
*General Director of Plataforma.
