All signs coming out of the Stockholm meeting earlier this week suggest the possibility of a trade agreement between the United States and China. The official statements, but also the body language of U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, indicate a mutual commitment to finding common ground. Donald Trump even let slip that a deal could be reached with import tariffs ranging between 15 to 20 percent — in line with the figures negotiated between Washington and Brussels. Meanwhile, there’s talk of a potential three-month postponement of any trade retaliation if a deal isn’t finalized by today — a clear sign that both parties want an agreement.
Both countries stand to gain significantly, but global geopolitics itself also needs a return to multilateralism and global trade, or risk a deep economic and political crisis. The key question lies in the concessions. Trump demanded major European investments in the U.S., especially in the energy sector, and Ursula von der Leyen faced criticism from several European countries — particularly Germany. “It was tough, but it was the best we could do,” said the President of the European Commission. In China’s case, Trump’s pressure focuses on opening up the Chinese economy, especially to American companies.
The principle seems simple enough: China wants to rejoin globalization because domestic consumption alone is not sufficient to sustain the high growth rates it aspires to. In return, Trump wants the Chinese market to once again serve as a field for American growth. If that’s the path taken, Chinese markets could open not only to U.S. companies but to companies worldwide — particularly European ones. Essentially, it would mark a return to a world that allowed for strong economic growth across various regions, since Chinese production factors and the scale of its market are as essential to the West as global markets are to China.
“Make business not war.” While the phrase is American, it fundamentally expresses a global interest in free and mutually beneficial trade. That was the idea behind China’s entry into the World Trade Organization; but it is also the idea of mutual benefit that has been undermined by China’s expansion into global markets, particularly after the zero-Covid policy. It remains to be seen how Beijing will respond to the mounting pressure against the protectionism it has employed to safeguard its own growth, often justified by its classification as a developing country, still lagging behind in many sectors compared to more developed partners.
Now that China asserts itself as a global power, it challenges Western hegemony — but still needs international markets to continue growing. That makes it harder to justify its access to global markets if it does not open its own economy. And this is Beijing’s new challenge: to find that negotiating balance.
For the world at large, the signs are positive, because it now seems possible to ease the tension and uncertainty currently dominating the global economy. In the end, the recovery of global trade and cross-border investment may be the only way to fulfill Beijing’s broader vision for the Greater Bay Area — not just Macau and Hong Kong.
The most delicate question is how this small region can respond to the opportunities that may arise from China’s opening. The truth is, there are still no signs of that; and that’s a unique challenge in itself. Macau could directly benefit from China’s relationship with the rest of the world, but it still lacks a great deal — almost everything — to do so.
*Director-General of PLATAFORMA.
