The victory of the Democratic Alliance, by just two more lawmakers than the Socialist Party, opens up a governance dilemma: even with the support of the Liberal Initiative, to become prime minister Luís Montenegro needs the support of the radical right of Chega. If he doesn’t, he risks a crisis of governance; if he does, he risks paying dearly for this alliance in the medium term. This instability is currently focusing Portuguese thinking on its parliamentary navel, which makes it difficult to think about the external front. In the short term, this is a bad sign for the Lusophone project – or for relations between Lisbon and Beijing.
Traditionally, the PSD is closer to the Atlantic arc and the Anglo-Saxon vision of the world, because the ideological basis of the PS comes from the multilateralist version of the Socialist International of Olof Palm and Willy Brandt. But it’s also true that this ideological barrier is fallacious today. Take, for example, the centre-left economic governance of António Costa and Mário Centeno, which has taken the centre-right’s banner of deficit control and the right accounts.
The central question, as far as Macau is concerned, and its potential for mediation on the Sino-Lusophone platform, is who succeeds João Cravinho as Foreign Minister in Lisbon – and what vision of the world he brings us. Especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Huawei’s elimination of the 5G network in Portugal – under clear pressure from Washington – Portuguese diplomacy has moved away from the position that had brought it closer to China. In theory, Lisbon and Beijing have the highest strategic partnership, “global and comprehensive”, which has allowed for the very strong Chinese investment in Portugal, especially relevant after the 2008 crisis. In practice, this hasn’t been the case recently.
I’m not surprised that the centre-right will adopt a position that is even more surrendered to Anglo-Saxon pressure. Because the last one that the Portuguese centre-left followed exceeded the most negative expectations that China could have had. Beijing’s displeasure may even be at the root of, for example, the restriction of residency rights in Macau, or the policy of opening to visa-free travel. Portugal was left off the first list that facilitates travelling to China, which was justified because it included the world’s largest economies. In the second list, published last week, countries such as Luxembourg and Poland appear… and Portugal is still left out.
There are always arguments based on democratic messianism against China. There always have been; they’re not new, nor do they make any more sense today than they did when Portugal gave them up in the name of Macau and the interests it managed with China. Because there are always good arguments for a European and universalist country to prefer to position itself in a more equidistant and impartial way, because it’s in its interests. Just like other European countries, such as Germany and France; or other Portuguese-speaking nations, such as Brazil and Angola.
However inevitable strategic and defense relations with the United States may be, thinking about the future of the world without economic and political relations with China makes no sense. In the specific case of Macau, it’s even impossible and absurd. Portugal owes this to Macau, and it is to be hoped that the new Portuguese government will show clear signs of this awareness. That’s one area where it’s easy to do better than the last socialist version.
