China is becoming more popular than the United States in Europe. This is the finding of the latest study by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, based on over 100,000 interviews. In nearly every European country, Beijing now surpasses Washington in public perception—an inversion from 2021, when the same study earned the Danish organization Chinese sanctions for “seriously harming China’s sovereignty and interests by spreading lies and disinformation.”
The return of Donald Trump to the White House would, at first glance, appear to set the stage for a renewed rapprochement between Brussels and Beijing, echoing the cautious pragmatism of 2017. But today’s world is more rigid, more fragmented, and far less forgiving of illusions. For the European Union, any deepening of ties with China hinges on two non-negotiable demands: recognition of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and a clear commitment to correcting the trade imbalances caused by China’s industrial model.
On the first point, the EU’s demand is moral and political. China, European diplomats argue, doesn’t need to take up arms to acknowledge that there is an aggressor and a victim, and that formal neutrality can, in practice, become complicity. Beijing disagrees: naming the war is, above all, betraying Moscow—a strategic, neighboring partner and fellow challenger of the Western order. By refusing to label the conflict, China affirms its internal consistency, but closes a door to closer ties with Europe.
The second issue is more economic, though no less political. With the U.S. market closed off by punitive tariffs, China has turned to Europe as an outlet for its production surplus. Electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, and industrial goods are arriving at unbeatable prices, suffocating European industry at a time when the continent is trying to reduce dependencies and strengthen strategic autonomy. Europe asks for restraint; China responds with realism: with weak domestic consumption and a real estate sector in crisis, it cannot afford to idle its industrial machine.
Both sides hold coherent positions. Neither acts in bad faith. But their models are, at the core, irreconcilable. Asking China to reconfigure its diplomacy and redesign its economic model is asking it to abandon pillars of its own stability. In Beijing, such a demand is seen not as negotiation, but as interference.
To complicate matters, the recent trade truce between Washington and Beijing has diluted Europe’s leverage. With partial access to the U.S. market restored and Southeast Asia absorbing more and more Chinese exports, Beijing is less dependent on Europe. Meanwhile, the United States—now under more aggressive leadership—is pressuring its allies to align in a united front against China: excluding Chinese companies from critical supply chains and raising the cost of European neutrality.
The EU–China relationship thus faces a classic paradox: what happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object? We are witnessing a logical deadlock, a structural tension. Neither side wants to break ties, but both refuse to yield. Neither wants confrontation, but neither accepts the other’s terms.
Europe is trying to remain in the middle—defending its values, protecting its economy, and avoiding submission to either power. But that middle ground requires influence, cohesion, and autonomy—qualities that are currently in short supply. The true European challenge is to remain independent in a confrontation it cannot control.
*Executive Director of PLATAFORMA
