War has a dangerous political advantage: it simplifies everything. It divides the world into friends and enemies, turns doubt into betrayal, replaces negotiation with force and gives leaders the appearance of resolve. That is why it is so difficult to leave war behind. Not only because conflicts have deep causes, but because there are always those who learn to live politically within them.
The possible understanding between the United States and Iran should be read against this reality. More than celebrating or rejecting the agreement before it fully exists, what matters is understanding what is at stake: an attempt to stop a spiral that already threatens too many fronts at once. Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Gaza, energy, inflation, elections, military alliances… In the Middle East, a crisis rarely remains confined to where it began.
In this context, diplomacy is not an act of generosity — it is an exercise in restraint. No one comes to a table like this out of pure idealism. They come because the alternative has become too costly, unpredictable or pointless. That is precisely the value of an agreement: it does not solve every problem, but it prevents each problem from turning into a new war.
The danger lies with those who confuse security with permanent escalation. Some leaders seem comfortable only when tension is rising, when the enemy remains in sight and any compromise can be presented as weakness. That logic is devastating. In the short term, it may yield domestic gains; but it impoverishes countries, destroys societies and makes any stable regional architecture impossible.
The real test is not whether leaders can start a war. Almost all of them can. The test is whether they have the courage to leave it without pretending they have won everything
The Middle East knows this cycle well. Every war is presented as necessary, every military operation as decisive, every postponement of politics as unavoidable. Then the dead are counted, cities are rebuilt, resentment multiplies and the next crisis is prepared. The promise of absolute security often ends up producing permanent insecurity.
That is also why every attempt at negotiation must be protected from the noise made by those who benefit from failure. Not because an agreement is, by definition, just or sufficient. But because the absence of an agreement is almost always occupied by those who prefer the language of weapons.
The Palestinian question remains the open wound that no regional solution can pretend to ignore. Precisely for that reason, rebuilding political space is even more urgent. Without negotiation, all that remains is rubble, retaliation and declarations of victory without peace.
The real test is not whether leaders can start a war. Almost all of them can. The test is whether they have the courage to leave it without pretending they have won everything. In the Middle East, as in so many other regions, peace does not fail only for lack of agreements. It fails because too many actors have made war a habit, a tool and, in some cases, a way of life.
