In his opinion piece this week in the *Macau Daily Times* about Au Kam San, Paulo Coutinho highlights the first time that the National Security Law — amended in 2023 — has been used to charge a political figure: a former legislator critical of Beijing. This is indeed relevant; but there is another noteworthy point: unlike the exclusion of Ron Lam from the legislative elections, which was shrouded in procedural secrecy, this time the official position is clear and unequivocal: “He has maintained contacts with various anti-China entities located outside the MSAR, and repeatedly provided false information about Macau to those entities or to media outlets operated by those entities.”
It is not known what contacts Au Kam San maintained. But the attack on media “operated” by such entities — while common in China and recurrent in Hong Kong — had never before been stated in Macau with such clarity. In this case, the Judiciary Police act as a kind of disciplinary committee, under a National Security Law interpreted as an “atomic bomb” that detonates illusions about political practice and the management of freedoms over the past 25 years. Au Kam San has always existed; he was once much more active, influential, and critical than he is today. Therefore, the novelty is not him, but rather the rise of security imperatives and Beijing’s control in the new “hygienic” cycle. Regardless of the facts that may be established and the outcome of the case, this is a declaration of strength and a warning to all about what the authorities are — or are not — willing to tolerate.
Beijing knows what it is doing; it does not need anyone to explain that Macau’s and China’s external image suffers far more from this version of official truths than from Au Kam San’s contacts — whoever they may be with. It also knows that foreign newspapers — often unfair and incomplete, it must be said — are not in the pay of venal organisations; they are, rather, often guided by dominant perceptions in their own geographies. Those perceptions can and should be challenged; but it is harder to do so when practices hand them ammunition. The political point here is that the decision is deliberate; and, knowingly, Beijing accepts the image it projects. The local population understands well what this case means for their relationship with authority; and the political power makes it clear that its priority is not openness or image management, but rather social and political harmony at a turbulent time of resistance to the new cycle and great international uncertainty.
There is another hidden element here: the political debate within Beijing itself, and the quiet discussion over Xi Jinping’s fourth term. As in so many other moments in modern history, China must find the difficult synthesis of its own ideological debate: between Deng Xiaoping’s initiatory vision and the moments when nationalism, discipline, and authority are the Communist Party’s primary instruments — in China and in the world. In an increasingly dangerous world, the degree of openness is a crucial decision for China — one it will not make because of anodyne statements such as Portugal’s, which says it is “following the case with attention,” nor because of trade wars or any foreign threats. It must make it for itself; and with that, either set Macau free to face the world — or lock it into its own retreat.
From the perspective of this small city, it is worth remembering at this point that the risk Macau poses to Chinese politics is zero; there will never be here either the intention or the capacity to influence anything in Beijing; there are no significant anti-China sentiments; and even if they arise in isolated cases, they will never be consequential. But in the field of geostrategy, in the narrative of an oasis of diversity — and freedoms — a sort of testing ground for external relations, and in the projection of the Second System, including Taiwan, Macau can be relevant. The message President Xi left here in December scored many points in that direction; yet it was undermined by practices and decisions sending the opposite signal. That is the calculation Macau should ask Beijing to make: what does it actually want to gain, when nothing is truly at risk? Why risk losing what can be preserved, when it is easy to gain all there is to gain without losing authority or strategic control in the process?
* Director-General of PLATAFORMA.
