If there is a political earthquake in China, its epicenter lies in the Central Military Commission. Of the seven members of this powerful pillar of the regime who took office in October 2022, only two remain: Xi Jinping himself, who appointed them all, and one of the vice-chairmen, Zhang Shengmin. Last week, Liu Zhenli and the other vice-chairman – the all-powerful Zhang Youxia – fell. Both are suspected of corruption, like the three previously dismissed; but now with a nuance: they also betrayed, and “seriously,” according to the state press, the functional obligations of their posts. In Chinese political semiotics, they disobeyed the political command.
It is difficult to define the real contours of this tectonic movement at the top of the military hierarchy. What is easy to see is that Xi Jinping takes very seriously the trust he demands from his leadership; just as obvious is the difficulty of stabilizing the armed wing of the regime. The consequence is simple and natural, whether one thinks in the short term, in the exercise of power, or looks further ahead, to the guarantees of the day after. There is also that law of life: sooner or later, that day will come. That is, either they are now one hundred percent with the President, or they simply cannot be – neither today nor tomorrow. In theory, they might even have that art, representing networks of interest strong enough to impose themselves from the shadows. However, from what can be seen, that is impossible – which is also not surprising. According to calculations by the Sing Tao Daily, in the last three years, 28 generals have already been taken out.
Either they are one hundred percent with the President, or they simply cannot be – neither today nor tomorrow. In theory, they might even have that art, representing networks of interest strong enough to impose themselves from the shadows. However, from what can be seen, that is impossible – which is also not surprising.
Rumors are not lacking; speculation abounds… taken together, they do not amount to evidence. Western analysts – generally seduced by views that do not fit Chinese reality – suggest ideological divergences, different practices, or even strategic conflict, namely regarding Taiwan. There are even those who say that Zhang Youxia sheltered under his influence figures of some future yet to be defined. This context is mined by a methodical doubt: whenever the future of China is conjectured in the West, the thesis of greater liberalism and openness comes to the fore; in China, by contrast, Xi Jinping is often seen as the supreme moderator, the only one capable of keeping the focus on national security and the fight against corruption, while simultaneously promoting openness and peaceful globalization. That is, containing the military hawks who prefer a bellicose China, imposing itself through military power. In this context, I am always reminded, when Yevgeny Prigozhin marched toward Moscow, of the lyricists who described that sinister figure of Russian bellicism as a kind of messiah of Soviet democracy. If it were not serious… it would be laughable.
Whatever the context, for many months China Brief had been pointing to Zhang as on the brink of falling. The most explosive thesis is now put forward by the Wall Street Journal, where a Chinese journalist reveals the transfer to the United States of secrets from China’s nuclear program. In any country, this would be an act of high treason which, if it proceeds, portends consequences far more serious than corruption. However one looks at it, two facts are exactly what they appear to be: the Central Military Commission has gone very badly; but Xi Jinping is showing the strength required of someone who redesigns centers of power of this magnitude.
Director General of PLATAFORMA
